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ABSTRACT The network intrusion detection system is an important tool for protecting computer networks
against threats and malicious attacks. Many techniques have recently been proposed; however, these face
significant challenges due to the continuous emergence of new threats that are not recognized by existing
systems. In this paper, we propose a novel two-stage deep learning (TSDL) model, based on a stacked
auto-encoder with a soft-max classifier, for efficient network intrusion detection. The model comprises
two decision stages: an initial stage responsible for classifying network traffic as normal or abnormal,
using a probability score value. This is then used in the final decision stage as an additional feature, for
detecting the normal state and other classes of attacks. The proposed model is able to learn useful feature
representations from large amounts of unlabeled data and classifies them automatically and efficiently.
To evaluate its effectiveness, several experiments are conducted on two public datasets, specifically the
benchmark KDD99 and UNSW-NB15 datasets. Comparative simulation results demonstrate that our pro-
posed model significantly outperforms existing approaches, achieving high recognition rates, up to 99.996%
and 89.134%, for the KDD99 and UNSW-NB15 datasets respectively. We conclude that our model has the
potential to serve as a future benchmark for the deep learning and network security research communities.
INDEX TERMS Computational intelligence, two-stage deep learningmodel, feature representation, network
intrusion detection, stacked auto-encoder.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the growing use of computer networks across different
fields and applications, network security is becoming increas-
ingly important. Many organizations use traditional security
tools such as firewalls, anti-spam techniques, antiviruses, etc.,
to protect against network attacks. Unfortunately, these are
unable to recognize new and sophisticated attacks. Recently,
Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDSs) have emerged
as a second line of defence to monitor network activity and
detect intrusive events. They are now considered as powerful
defence tools that can protect against sophisticated attacks
and threats [1].
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Yin Zhang.
Network intrusion detection is not a trivial task [2], [3].
There are several problems and challenges faced by network
intrusion detection approaches for efficiently and effectively
recognizing anomalies [4]. The first problem arises from
the variety and variability of malicious attacks and threats.
Existing intrusion detection methods are unable to cope
with continuous evolutions in the cyber threat landscape and
the emergence of new threats; hence many are inefficient
at achieving high detection rates or reducing false alarms.
The second problem is that classical machine learning meth-
ods used in network intrusion detection approaches present
several difficulties, such as overfitting and high bias due to
irrelevant or redundant features, and the imbalanced class
distribution of network traffic [5]. The third problem is related
to the complexity of labeling the traffic dataset for developing
a NIDS [6]. Substantial efforts are required to produce such
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labeled datasets over a period of time. These problems make
intrusion detection methods ineffective at detecting real-
world threats in large-scale environments. Moreover, they are
unable to efficiently learn feature representations in order to
build a more effective predictive model.
Recently, deep-learning-based methods have been suc-
cessfully applied in, amongst other tasks, image recogni-
tion, speech recognition [7], and action recognition [8], [9],
etc. These methods aim to learn relevant features from
a large sample of unlabeled data features and subse-
quently apply them to a limited amount of labeled data
features, in a supervised learning fashion. The labeled
and unlabeled data may come from different distribu-
tions, but they must be relevant to each other [10].
For example, Ahsan et al. [11] developed a novel Random
Neural Network (RNN) for real-time cognitive system design
requirements. They integrated the RNN with a genetic algo-
rithm to achieve real-time decision-making. Other recent
approaches have proposed alternative multi-layered echo
state network, deep, reinforcement, and multi-task learning
methods [12]–[15].
Thus far, few works have utilized deep learning algorithms
for network intrusion detection, for instance, deep belief
networks (DBNs), restricted Boltzmann machines (RBMs),
stacked auto-encoders (SAEs), and supervised learning with
convolutional neural networks (CNNs). Even though CNNs
can reduce the number of parameters through strategies of
sparse connectivity and shared weights, these algorithms are
designed for supervised learning and require a large amount
of labeled network data as input, which is a rather costly
option.
In the past, before the emergence of deep learning con-
cepts, the weights of a supervised neural network with
two or more hidden layers in the training phase were ran-
domly initialized from a Gaussian distribution. Subsequently,
a back-propagation optimization method was applied in order
to find the optimal parameters. In practice, this method based
on random initialization was shown to lead to slow optimiza-
tion and poor local minima solutions, since the loss function
is extremely uncontrolled when parameterized by millions
of correlated variables. To accommodate these limitations,
Hinton et al. [16] proposed the concept of deep learning to
optimize the learning problem, by pre-training each layer of
the network in an unsupervised way, to learn a discrimina-
tive representation of the data before the classification task.
Additionally, Vincent et al. [17] proposed a method, based on
a stacked denoising auto-encoder (SDAE) to enable a deep
neural network to learn a useful representation of features.
With use of effective feature learning, redundant or irrelevant
features in the training data, which can lead to overfitting, are
reduced. A key reason for the overfitting problem in a real-
time NIDS is feature redundancy in the training data of the
system model.
In this paper, we exploit the deep stacked auto-encoder
(DSAE) as part of a novel cascade architecture, termed two-
stage deep learning (TSDL), for feature learning and dimen-
sionality reduction, in which the output of the first stage is
used as input in the next stage, with optimised feature rep-
resentation and redundancy reduction. The proposed model
differs from previous works as it learns feature representation
in two stages. The first stage learns feature representation
for classifying normal and abnormal network traffic with a
probability score value. This value is used as an additional
feature in the second stage in order to learn feature represen-
tation of normal traffic and other types of attacks. The first
stage aims to avoid the overfitting problem and to mitigate
the bias towards normal traffic, through an increased focus on
abnormal traffic. This not only helps to confirm the detection
of the normal class but also contributes to the classification of
other types of attacks. The purpose of this research is to build
a two-stage feature-learning model based on deep learning
for improving accuracy and reducing false alarm rates of the
NIDS.
The main contributions of our work can be summarized as
follows:
1) We propose a novel two-stage semi-supervised feature-
learning model for network intrusion detection, with
two modes of operations, i.e., two-class and multiclass
intrusion detection. The proposed model has a unique
topology and architecture compared to existing works
in this domain.
2) We introduce a low-cost DSAE approach for NIDSs,
which uses a reduced number of features compared
to other state-of-the-art approaches (5 abstract features
for 2-class intrusion detection and 10 abstract features
for multiclass intrusion detection). This makes the pro-
posed model more efficient for real-time detection.
3) We optimize the parameters of the proposed
model using best practices reported in deep learning
research [18].
4) We demonstrate the model’s effectiveness in detecting
sophisticated new attacks by conducting experiments
on two benchmark public datasets, namely, an older
KDD99 dataset and the new UNSW-NB15 dataset.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
in section II, we present related work on machine learn-
ing and deep-learning-based intrusion detection models and
approaches. In section III, we provide background knowl-
edge on general auto-encoder neural networks. In section IV,
we introduce the methodology used in this study in more
detail. In section V, we describe the experiments and
evaluation, including tools and datasets used, the data
pre-processing step, and comparative experimental results.
Finally, in section VI, we summarize our conclusions and
outline future work directions.
II. RELATED WORK
Over the past few years, a number of models and
approaches based on traditional machine learning have
been proposed for network intrusion detection. Examples
include the Support Vector Machine (SVM) [24], [25], K-
Nearest Neighbors (KNN) [26], Artificial Neural Networks
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(ANN) [17], [18], Random Forests (RF) [24], [25], [59],
Decision Trees (DT) [23], [26], [27], [60], [61], Linear
Regression (LR), Naïve Bayes (NB), Expectation Max-
imization (EM) [23], Simulated Annealing (SA) [27],
Simplified Swarm Optimization (SSO) [28], Neutrosophic
Logic (NL) [29], Neurotree [30], Random Effects Logis-
tic Regression (RELR) [31], PCA filtering [62], and oth-
ers reported in [32]–[34]. Recently, Nawir et al. [35]
proposed a classification model based on the Average One
Dependence Estimator (AODE) algorithm for multiclass
classification, on the UNSW-NB15 dataset, reporting an
accuracy of 83.47% and a false alarm rate (FAR) of 6.57%.
Janarthanan and Zargari [36] applied the RF classifier on the
UNSW-NB15 dataset to detect and classify intrusion attacks
with five selected features, with an accuracy of 81.6175% and
FAR of 4.4%.
Deep learning, a branch of machine learning, has recently
been used for network intrusion detection. State-of-the-art
deep learning approaches and methods that have been used
for unsupervised feature learning for network intrusion detec-
tion, include deep belief networks (DBNs), deep neural
networks (DNNs), restricted Boltzmann machines (RBMs),
auto-encoders, and variations of these methods. For example,
Erfani et al. [37] proposed a new approach, which combined
DBNs with a linear one-class SVM for intrusion detection
and applied it on several benchmark datasets. Similarly,
Fiore et al. [38] presented a discriminative RBM (DRBM)
method to learn compressed features from specific features
that are not in the packet payloads. The compressed features
are fed into a soft-max classifier to create a binary classifi-
cation of normal and abnormal behaviors. Javaid et al. [39]
presented a deep learning method based on DNNs for
anomaly detection. Their results showed that deep learning is
more effective for flow-based anomaly detection in software-
defined networks (SDNs). Tang et al. [40] introduced a deep
learning approach for network intrusion detection based on
self-taught learning (STL), applied to the NSL-KDD dataset.
Their experimental results showed that deep learning sur-
passes previous studies in terms of performance and accu-
racy. Wang [41] proposed a deep learning approach based
on the stacked auto-encoder for network traffic recognition
from raw data and attained remarkably high performance.
Additionally, Yin et al. [42] proposed a deep learning
method built on recurrent neural networks (RNNs) for intru-
sion detection. This method was applied on the NSL-KDD
dataset and demonstrated that deep learning methods for
intrusion detection outperform traditional machine learn-
ing classification approaches. Alrawashdeh and Purdy [43]
also introduced a deep learning approach based on a DBN of
RBMs with one and four hidden layers for feature reduction.
The weights of the DBN were updated in a fine-tuning phase
and the classification task was performed using a Logistic
Regression classifier. The proposed approach was imple-
mented on the KDD99 dataset and achieved an accuracy
of 97.9% with a false alarm rate of 0.5%. Nevertheless,
the accuracy on this old benchmark dataset is still not high
FIGURE 1. An m/h/m auto-encoder architecture.
enough to make this a strong approach for network intrusion
detection.
Shone et al. [44] presented a deep learning approach
for intrusion detection based on a non-symmetric deep
auto-encoder (NDAE). This technique was applied on the
KDD99 dataset using RF as a classifier and achieved an
accuracy rate up to 97.85%. However, the false alarm rate
was as high as 2.15%, which makes this method ineffec-
tive for the detection of sophisticated attacks. More recently,
Nguyen et al. [45] proposed a framework based on principal
component analysis (PCA) and a Gaussian-binary restricted
Boltzmann machine (GRBM) to detect cyber attacks in the
mobile cloud environment. However, the testing methodol-
ogy of this approach is unclear and not sufficiently detailed
to enable comparative benchmarking.
In order to recognize more sophisticated attacks, the model
proposed in this paper is designed to learn more useful
feature representations from large amounts of unlabeled
features. Moreover, to improve the flexibility of current
NIDSs, the proposed model can detect network intrusions
in two modes of operations, namely normal and abnormal
state detection, in addition to detecting normal states and
other types of attacks. Unlike existing models, we propose a
two-stage deep learning (TSDL) model for network intrusion
detection: a cascade model where the probability score value
of normal and abnormal state classification resulting from the
first stage is used as an additional feature for the second stage,
in order to classify the normal state and different types of
attacks.
III. PRELIMINARIES OF THE GENERAL AUTO-ENCODER
In this section, we briefly introduce the general notion of an
auto-encoder for the purpose of data reduction. Fundamen-
tally, an m/h/m auto-encoder is mathematically defined by a
tuple m, h, n,R,T, S,X,Y ,X ′,D, as shown in Figure 1:
- R is a set of real numbers.
- m and h are positive integers that represent the length
of X and Z . For data reduction, the case 0 < h < m is
considered.
- T is a mapping function from Rm to Rh.
- S is a mapping function from Rh to Rm.
- X = {x1, x2, . . . , xn} is a set of n training vectors
inRm.When external targets exist, Y = {y1, y2, . . . , yn}
is a set of n compressed vectors in Rh, and X ′ =
{x ′1, x ′2, . . . , x ′n} represents the equivalent set of target
vectors in Rm.
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- D is a distortion or dissimilarity function (e.g., the Lp
norm or Hamming distance), defined over Rm.
For any transformations T ∈ T and S ∈ S, the auto-encoder
transforms the input training vectors xi ∈ Rm into output
vectors T ◦ S(xi) ∈ Rm. The auto-encoder learns the weights
and biases of the transformations T and S using the training
vectors by minimizing the distortion function as defined in
the following equation:
E(T , S) =
m∑
i=1
E (xi) =
m∑
i=1
D(S(T (xi;w, b);w′, b′), xi) (1)
Where the weight matrix w and the bias vector b are the
parameters of T , and the weight matrix w′ and the bias vector
b′ are the parameters of S. When h < m, the auto-encoder
projects the data on a lower dimensional space, and thus
performs the data reduction and compression.
By using the general architecture of the auto-encoder,
different kinds of feature representations can be obtained,
based on the best choice of mappings T and S, the distortion
function D, and the use of additional constraints such as
generalization and regularization. A deep neural network is
defined by stacking a number of auto-encoders. For many
classification problems, non-linear sigmoid activation is usu-
ally applied on the hidden layers. In the case of mapping
from Rm to Rh, the auto-encoders can work as though cor-
responding to T and S, which are classes of linear transfor-
mation functions. Therefore, T and S are matrices of size
h × m and m × h, respectively. The linear transformation
of Rm and Rh using D, which is a squared Euclidean dis-
tance, was presented in [46], [47]. Moreover, the theory of
complex-valued linear auto-encoders has also been extended
in [48].
IV. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we first present the theoretical concept behind
our proposed model. Then, the proposed TSDL model for
network intrusion detection is described in more detail. Fol-
lowing this, we briefly introduce the two public datasets
used to evaluate the model. Finally, we explain our method
for pre-processing the two datasets before describing the
simulation experiments and comparisons with state-of-the-art
approaches.
A. THEORETICAL CONCEPTS BEHIND THE PROPOSED
MODEL
The basic unit of the proposed TSDL model is the auto-
encoder (AE). AnAE is essentially a feed-forward neural net-
work similar to a multi-layer perceptron (MLP), composed of
three main layers, namely the input layer, one or more hidden
layer(s) and the output layer, where the numbers of neurons
in the output and input layers are equal. Figure 2 shows a
typical architecture of a simple AE consisting of a single
hidden layer.
The learning technique of an AE is unsupervised learning
because the AE learns the abstract compressed data repre-
FIGURE 2. The basic architecture of the AE with a single hidden layer.
sentation for reconstructing the original input data instead of
guessing the target output from the input. AnAE includes two
processes: the encoding process, which takes place between
the input layer and the hidden layer, and the decoding process,
which takes place between the hidden layer and the output
layer.
Suppose that the input layer of AE contains m nodes for
n input data vectors xi and h nodes in the hidden layer for
the equivalent set of abstract compressed data vectors yi. The
number of nodes in the output layer is equal to the number of
nodes in the input layer and the reconstructed vectors x ′i are
approximately equal to the input vectors, which are expressed
as follows:
xi ∼= x ′i, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n (2)
In the encoding process of the AE, the abstract compressed
data vectors yi can be computed as follows:
T : yi = g(xiw+ b), for i = 1, 2, . . . , n (3)
where w, b and xi are the weight matrix, the bias vector, and
the input vector in the input layer, respectively. On the other
hand, the decoding process of the AE can be used to calculate
the reconstructed data vectors x ′i :
S : x ′i = g(yiwT + b) (4)
Where wT , b, and yi are the transpose weight matrix, the bias
vector, and the abstract compressed data vector of the hidden
layer, respectively.
The function g, used in Eq. (3) and Eq. (4), can be a lin-
ear or nonlinear activation function. In our model, a sigmoid
function is used and computed as follows:
g (x) = 1/(1+ e−x) (5)
Once we learn the values of wT and b by applying the AE
on unlabeled data in an unsupervised learningmanner, we can
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use them in a supervised learning manner to tune the values
ofwT and b of the model, using a back-propagation algorithm
with a soft-max classifier, based on the training data vectors.
B. MODEL DESCRIPTION
The proposed TSDL model is a deep learning model that
consists of two stages: the initial and final decision stages.
The approach used for constructing these two stages is a deep
neural network (DNN), due to its performance and speed in
real-time classification. In the initial stage, network traffic
can be classified into normal or abnormal with a probability
score value. This value is used as an additional feature to
train the final decision stage for normal and multi-class attack
classification.
The DNN approach, which is adopted in both stages, com-
bines a DSAE comprising two hidden layers with a soft-
max layer classifier on top. To build the proposed TSDL
model, two tasks are performed in the training phase. The
first is a pre-training task, where each layer of the DSAE
is pre-trained individually using an unsupervised learning
technique. At each layer, the error arising from reconstructing
the input features is minimized.
The original unlabeled features are inputs to the first layer
and the output-compressed features are inputs to the second
layer. When the first and second layers are pre-trained sep-
arately, we stack them together and add a soft-max layer
on top as a classifier for the next task, which is termed a
fine-tuning task. In this task, a supervised learning technique
based on a back-propagation algorithm is utilized to tune the
parameters of the pre-trained DSAE model obtained from
the previous task. Thus, our proposed model is trained by
a semi-supervised learning technique. The aim of the fine-
tuning task is to furtherminimize the prediction error by using
labeled features. We briefly summarize the algorithmic steps
of the training phase in two stages of our TSDL model in
Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. The variables used in these
algorithms are presented in Table 1.
After the training phase is completed, the TSDL model
is able to classify unseen network traffic instances.
Figure 3 shows the steps of the trained TSDL model dur-
ing the classification phase. The first stage is intended to
reduce the overfitting problem and mitigate bias towards
normal traffic, by placing more focus on abnormal traffic,
in order to classify the other types of attacks. The proposed
model also provides a discriminative, abstract feature space
to differentiate between normal and abnormal network traffic
flows.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND EVALUATION
To evaluate and validate the proposed TSDL model for a
NIDS, two publicly available datasets have been used. These
are the benchmark KDD99 dataset and the new, complex
UNSW-NB15 dataset. In the next subsections, the description
of the two datasets, the preprocessing step and the compar-
ative results are presented in detail. The preprocessing step
consists of normalization and resampling of the datasets so
Algorithm 1 Initial Decision Stage Algorithm
Input: x, t, lx, lt
Output: TMDNNI, pcl and pv.
1. Begin
//Initializing the parameters
2. initializeParameters(p);
//Reading Train and Test feature sets
3. readData (x, t, lx, lt) ;
//Pre-training task to learn the feature representation
4. y← preTrain(x, IN1,H1);
5. v← preTrain(y, IN2,H2);
//Fine-tuning task to tune the parameters
6. DSAEI← stackedLayers (H1,H2) ;
7. DNNI← stackedLayers (IN,DSAEI,OT) ;
8. TMDNNI← fineTune(x, lx,DNN1);
//Classification
9. [pcl, pv]← classify(t,TMDNNI);
10. returnTMDNNI, pcl, pv
11. End
TABLE 1. Notations used in Algorithms 1 and 2.
they can be efficiently and effectively handled with the TSDL
model.
A. TOOL DESCRIPTION
The experiments are conducted using MATLAB version
R2015a on a laptop, with a 2.0 GHz Intel Core i7-4510U
processor, 8 GB of RAM and a 64-bit Windows 10 operating
system.
B. PERFORMANCE METRICS
To evaluate the performance of the TSDL model, the same
evaluation measures are adopted as in most previous research
on NIDSs. Specifically, literature review shows that accu-
racy, precision, recall, F-measure, and false alarm rate (FAR)
metrics have been widely used to evaluate the effectiveness
of most intrusion detection systems [45]. These metrics are
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Algorithm 2 Final Decision Stage Algorithm
Input: x, t, lx, lt, pv,TMDDNI
Output: TrainedDNN1 and pclAllattcks
1. Begin
//Initializing the parameters
2. initializeParameters(p);
//Reading Train and Test feature sets
3. readData (x, t, lx, lt, pv,TMDDNI) ;
//Features concatenation
4. fc← concatFeature(x, pv);
//Pre-training task to learn the feature representation
5. y← preTrain(fc, IN1,H1);
6. v← preTrain(y, IN2,H2);
//Fine-tuning task to tune the parameters
7. DSAEF← stackedLayers (H1,H2) ;
8. DNNF← stackedLayers (IN,DSAEF,OT) ;
9. TrainedDNNF← fineTune(fc, lx,DNNF);
//Classification
10. [pcl, pv]← classify(t,TMDNNI);
11. fc← concatFeature(t, pv);
12. [pclAllattcks]← classify(fc,TMDNNF);
13. returnTMDNNF,pclAllattcks
14. End
computed using the following equations:
Accuracy (ACC) = (TP+ TN )/(TP+TN+FP+FN )
(6)
Precision(P) = TP/(TP+ FP) (7)
Recall(R) = TP/(TP+ FN ) (8)
F − measure = 2× ((P× R)/(P+ R)) (9)
FalseAlarmRate(FAR) = FP/(FP+ TN ) (10)
where TP, TN, FP, and FN are true positives, true negatives,
false positives, and false negatives, respectively.
Furthermore, the execution time of the proposed model is
computed to evaluate its efficiency for real-time detection.
C. DATASETS DESCRIPTION
A number of publicly available datasets have been used for
NIDS evaluation. However, they do not truly represent cur-
rent real-world network traffic attacks. Assessing the degree
of realism of these datasets for NIDSs is also a challenging
task [26], [50]. Therefore, several evaluation metrics are used
by researchers to measure the degree of realism, in an attempt
to produce more representative datasets containing scalable,
active behaviors of normal and abnormal traffic [50], [51].
This is imperative for the reliability and credibility of any
developed NIDS. In this work, an older benchmark, namely
the KDD99 dataset, and a new benchmark, the UNSW-
NB15 dataset, are used to evaluate the TSDL model. The
results of both benchmark datasets are analyzed in terms of
accuracy and detection rate, to evaluate the effectiveness of
our proposed model.
FIGURE 3. Overview of the classification phase based on the TSDL model.
The KDD99 dataset is widely used for NIDS performance
evaluation [52]. The normal and attack behaviors in the
KDD99 dataset are outdated and do not have any complex
variations on current network traffic, which makes the eval-
uation of any NIDS misleading [26]. This might explain the
reasons behind the high accuracy rates attained by various
existing models. Additionally, this dataset includes a set of
redundant records [30] and produces unbalanced distribution
among the different classes of traffic [53]. It comprises about
5 million records, including abnormal and normal events
collected over a number of weeks [53]. Each record con-
sists of 41 continuous and nominal features, as well as a
type label, which determines the class of traffic: normal
or attack. We can find 22 different types belonging to one
of four popular attacks, namely the Remote-to-Local (R2L)
attack, User-to-Root (U2R) attack, Probing attack (probe)
and Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Three sets of features
exist in the KDD99 dataset: traffic features, content fea-
tures and basic features. Traffic features are calculated by
examining the connections established in the past two sec-
onds, and are divided into two different groups, i.e., the host
features (such as rerror_rate, serror_rate,etc.) and service
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features (such as srv_rerror_rate, srv_serror_rate, etc.) [50].
Content features allow the detection of suspicious behavior
(such as num_compromised, Num_failed_logins, logged_in,
etc.). Basic features are attributes extracted from TCP/IP
connections (such as protocol_type, duration, service, flag,
dst_bytes, scr_bytes,etc.). Besides these features, there is also
an attack category label field for each instance in the dataset,
named attack_cat. This field represents either the normal
state or the attack category name. For differentiating the
normal instances from abnormal instances, we add another
field, label, which takes a value of 1 for abnormal traffic and
0 for normal traffic.
UNSW-NB15 is a newer dataset collected at the Australian
Centre for Cyber Security (ACCS) by the cyber security
research group [54]. A raw data of 100 GB was collected
using TCP dump and Ixia PerfectStorm tools representing
normal andmodern network traffic attacks. The data was gen-
erated over two different simulation periods of 15 hours and
16 hours, respectively. There are approximately 2.5 million
records within the UNSW-NB15 dataset. A total of 49 fea-
tures were extracted using Bro-IDS, Argus tools, and some
newly developed algorithms. The features of this dataset
are divided into five sets: time features, content features,
flow features, basic features, and additional originated fea-
tures. In addition to these features, there are two labels:
attack_cat, which is either the normal state or the attack
category name, and label, which is 1 for abnormal traffic and
0 for normal traffic. There are nine types of attacks in the
UNSW-NB15 dataset, including Worms, Shellcode, Recon-
naissance, Analysis, Generic, Backdoor, DoS, Exploits, and
Fuzzers [23].
Each dataset is partitioned into two distinct parts, a training
dataset and a testing dataset, to assess the performance of
any system developed for network intrusion detection [55].
Since the original size of the KDD99 is too large [23],
[52], 10% of the KDD99 [56] is usually used to evalu-
ate the proposed model. For the UNSW-NB15 dataset, a
partition from the original dataset was selected as a train-
ing set (UNSW_NB15_training-set.csv) [57], which is also
used for model evaluation. This partition has 45 features
including the record ID and two class labels. Table 2 shows
different classes of the 10% of KDD99 dataset used for
training, and Table 3 shows the different classes of the
UNSW-NB15 training dataset.
D. DATA PREPROCESSING
The data-preprocessing step includes two main tasks: the
nominal-to-numeric data conversion and data-resampling
tasks. First, nominal-to-numeric data conversion is applied
on the two datasets. In the KDD99 dataset, there are
38 numeric features, three nonnumeric features, and
one nonnumeric attack category label. Meanwhile, the
UNSW-NB15 dataset contains 39 numeric features, 3 non-
numeric features, and 1 nonnumeric attack category label.
Since the proposed model only deals with numeric fea-
tures, the nonnumeric features are converted into numeric
TABLE 2. Data preprocessing of KDD99 dataset.
TABLE 3. Data preprocessing of UNSW-NB15 dataset.
values. For instance, the ’protocol_type’ feature contains
3 types of attributes, ’icmp’, ’tcp’, and ’udp’. These attributes
are converted into numeric integer values, 1, 2, and 3, respec-
tively. In the same way, the ’service’ feature, the ’flag’
feature and the ’attack_cat’ label are also represented by
numeric integer values. After this, the data-resampling task
is performed to solve the problems of redundant records and
imbalanced class distribution. By analyzing the two datasets,
we noticed that the KDD99 dataset includes a large number of
redundant instances [30], [53]. However, this issue does not
exist in the case of the UNSW-NB15 dataset [23]. Redun-
dant instances may lead to the problem of imbalanced class
distribution, which is known to bias a machine learning clas-
sifier towards the majority class [30], [53]. Imbalanced class
distribution is a key problem resulting either from repeated
instances, as in the case of KDD99 (see Figure 4), or a
large difference in the number of instances of each class,
as in the case of UNSW-NB15 (see Figure 5). Repeated
instances in the KDD99 dataset make the class distribution
of normal and abnormal records imbalanced, and the large
difference in the number of normal and abnormal records
in the UNSW-NB15 dataset leads to the same problem.
Therefore, we down-sample the KDD99 dataset by elimi-
nating repeated records, obtaining a sum of 145,586 unique
records out of 494,021 total instances (see Table 2). For the
UNSW-NB15 dataset, we used the Synthetic Minority
Over-sampling Technique (SMOTE) described in [58] to
up-sample the instances of normal and abnormal classes
and make the distribution more balanced, as shown
in Figure 5 and Table 3.
E. FEATURE NORMALIZATION
Feature normalization is a method utilized to normalize the
independent features into a specific range. In the case of
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FIGURE 4. Data preprocessing of KDD99 dataset; (a) original distribution
of normal and abnormal instances, and (b) new distribution of normal
and abnormal instances.
FIGURE 5. Data preprocessing of USNW-NB15 dataset; (a) original
distribution of normal and abnormal instances, and (b) new distribution
of normal and abnormal instances.
data processing, it is commonly known as data normalization.
There are some features obtained from the network traffic
that have a very large difference between the minimum and
the maximum values. To suppress the effect of these outliers,
a min-max scaling method is used to linearly normalize the
feature values in the range of 0 and 1, according to Eq. (11).
fi,j = fi,j −min(fi,j)
max
(
fi,j
)−min(fi,j) (11)
where fi,j represents the value of the feature in row i and
column j of the dataset.
F. RESULTS AND COMPARISONS
After implementing the proposed TSDL model in
MATLAB programing language, we tested it on the selected
datasets with a 10-fold cross validation method. Using this
method, each dataset is divided into ten parts, one of which
is used as a testing dataset while the remaining nine are used
as a training dataset. This method is repeated 10 times, and
the results are then averaged to yield a single estimation.
The advantage of this evaluation is that all observations are
employed for both training and testing, and each observation
can be used exactly once for testing the trained model. In this
context, we demonstrate the results of each stage of the
TSDL model. The results of the evaluation measures are
demonstrated for both initial and final decision stages. The
initial stage is responsible for normal and abnormal state
classification, whereas the final decision stage is used for
multi-class classification (normal state and other types of
attacks). This implies that the TSDL model is a flexible
FIGURE 6. Area under curve of normal and abnormal classification of
KDD99 dataset.
TABLE 4. Confusion matrix of normal and abnormal classification for
KDD99 dataset.
TABLE 5. Evaluation measures of normal and abnormal classification for
KDD99 dataset.
intrusion detection model with two options, as requested by
the user.
For the KDD99 dataset, the 41 features are normalized and
reduced to 10 abstract features using the initial trained DSAE
of the initial decision stage, and then classified into normal
and abnormal states using a soft-max classifier. The accuracy
of this stage according to the 10-fold cross validation test
is 99.931%: 145486 out of 145586 instances were correctly
classified. The confusion matrix and other evaluation mea-
sures are shown in Tables 4 and 5. Moreover, in order to
evaluate the quality or performance of normal and abnormal
detection, a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve
is shown in Figure 6. The blue dotted curve plots the true
positive rates (TPRs) on the y coordinate versus the false
positive rates (FPRs) on the x coordinate, and the red point
on the curve represents the area under curve (AUC) value of
the ROC curve.We note that the AUC has a value nearly equal
to 1, which confirms that the model produces better results.
In addition to Figure 6, Tables 5 and 7 demonstrate that our
model attains attractive results in terms of accuracy, precision,
recall and F-measure, with a very lowweighted average false-
alarm rate using 5 features compressed from the original ones.
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TABLE 6. Confusion matrix of normal and other types of attacks
classification for KDD99 dataset.
TABLE 7. Evaluation measures of normal and other types of attacks
classification for KDD99 dataset.
TABLE 8. Confusion matrix of normal and abnormal classification for
UNSW-NB15 dataset.
The normal and abnormal state classifications of the initial
decision stage are based on the prediction value of the soft-
max classifier, which is in the range 0 to 1. This predic-
tion value can be used as an additional feature in the final
decision stage. The 41 normalized features, as well as this
additional feature arising from the first stage, are reduced to
5 abstract features using the final DSAE model in the second
stage. These five abstract features are used to classify the
normal state and other types of attacks based on the soft-
max classifier in the final decision stage. The accuracy of the
10-fold cross validation test is 99.996%, representing correct
classification of 145580 out of 145586 instances. In Table 6,
a confusionmatrix shows the number of records for each class
that were classified correctly. Table 7 presents the sensitivity,
specificity and FAR of each class. The weighted averages
of sensitivity, specificity and FAR for each class are also
calculated and presented in Table 7.
Table 7 shows that the model achieves excellent results
under KDD99 by using only 10 abstract features. This is due
to the ability of our proposed model to compress the original
features to more discriminative abstract features and reduce
weak features that affect the detection rate.
Comparative experiments are also conducted on the new
UNSW-NB15 dataset to demonstrate the effectiveness of our
proposed TSDL model. By using the 10-fold cross valida-
tion test mode, the accuracy of the initial decision stage
is shown to be 89.711%. This corresponds to 212007 out
of 236323 instances being correctly classified. The confusion
TABLE 9. Evaluation measures of normal and abnormal classification for
UNSW-NB15 dataset.
FIGURE 7. Area under curve of normal and abnormal classification of
UNSW-NB15 dataset.
matrix is presented in Table 8 and other evaluation measures
are shown in Table 9.
From Table 9, we can see that the model achieves con-
sistently good results, above 89.7%, with respect to the pre-
cision, recall and F-measure, with a small average value of
FAR (0.1018). The quality of detection results is illustrated
by plotting the ROC graph, which is shown in Figure 7. The
red point on this curve represents the AUC value at which the
model produces the best detection results. We note that the
value of AUC in the graph is equal to 0.9.
For classification of the normal state and other types
of attacks, the accuracy is found to be 89.134%. That is,
210643 out of 236323 instances were correctly classified.
The confusionmatrix and other evaluationmeasures are listed
in Tables 10 and 11. The best F-measure values are obtained
for the Normal, Generic, Exploits, Fuzzers, and Reconnais-
sance classes, as 0.999990, 0.986158, 0.954066, 0.916957,
and 0.830501, respectively. We also note that the worst
F-measure values are attained by the other classes. The reason
for the poor F-measure values is that these classes are in
the minority compared to others—especially the Backdoor
and Worm, which have a very small number of instances.
Despite the problem of imbalanced class distribution in this
dataset, the proposed model is seen to achieve very good
results. These results prove the effectiveness and robust-
ness of our model. To show the advantages of using the
initial decision stage in terms of the effectiveness of the
TSDL model, we compute the accuracy and FAR of the
final stage without using the additional feature (PV). Accu-
racies of 98% and 87.35% are recorded for the KDD99 and
UNSW-NB15 datasets, respectively. In addition, FARs
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TABLE 10. Confusion matrix of normal and other types of attacks classification for UNSW-NB15 dataset.
TABLE 11. Evaluation measures of normal and other types of attacks
classification for UNSW-NB15 dataset.
TABLE 12. Results of final decision stage with and without additional
feature on KDD99 and UNSW-NB15 datasets.
of 0.15% and 1.14% are obtained for the KDD99 and
UNSW-NB15 datasets, respectively. As shown in Table 12,
using the additional feature clearly improves the effectiveness
of the TSDL model in terms of accuracy and FAR.
In Tables 13 and 14, we compare the TSDL model with
recent work on NIDSs conducted on the KDD99 and UNSW-
NB15 datasets.
The comparison is based on the number of features used,
the classifier adopted in each work, the results of FAR and
the accuracy. The reported results show the superiority of our
model over state-of-the-art approaches in the literature. The
proposed model achieves high accuracy by learning feature
representations from large amounts of unlabeled training fea-
tures. Using two-stage deep feature learning, our proposed
model is able to detect old and new intrusion attacks and
is less influenced by the presence of an unbalanced class
distribution between normal and abnormal traffic on the one
TABLE 13. Comparison results of TSDL model with state-of-the-art
methods on KDD99 dataset.
TABLE 14. Comparison results of TSDL model with state-of-the-art
methods on UNSW-NB15 dataset.
hand, and between the different categories of attacks on the
other.
We also compare TSDL with the MLP, which is a shal-
low architecture of the deep neural network. The accu-
racy and FAR for MLP and TSDL models are shown
in Tables 13 and 14. It can be seen that the TSDL
model attains a higher accuracy and lower FAR results
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TABLE 15. Average execution time of detection for one instance in
milliseconds.
than MLP and the state-of-the-art approaches. It pro-
vides 99.996% accuracy and a 0.00001% FAR for the
KDD99 dataset and 89.134% accuracy and a 0.7495% FAR
for the UNSW-NB15 dataset. Despite the complexity of the
UNSW-NB15 dataset, which contains a variety of modern
intrusion patterns [23], TSDL is less affected by these varia-
tions, achieving the highest accuracy when compared to state-
of-the-art models available in the literature.
Before evaluating the time efficiency of our model,
we assume the model is trained periodically on up-to-
date network traffic features in an offline manner. There-
fore, we focus on the running time of online detection
(See Table 15).
In Table 15, we summarize the average execution time in
milliseconds required to detect one instance for the initial
decision stage, the final decision stage and both stages.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed a novel two-stage deep
learning (TSDL)model based on a deep stacked auto-encoder
(DSAE) neural network, to deal with the problem of net-
work intrusion detection. The TSDL model comprises two
stages; each stage contains two hidden layers with a soft-
max classifier. The deep learning model is trained in a
semi-supervised manner. Specifically, each hidden layer is
separately pre-trained on a large set of unlabeled network
traffic features, in an unsupervised manner, and then fine-
tuned using labeled network traffic features. The first stage
of the model, termed the initial decision stage, is used to
classify the normal and abnormal states of network traffic.
The user can select the deep learning model to operate only
at this stage. To detect the normal state and other types of
attacks, the second decision stage is employed. In the latter,
our deep learning model works in a cascade manner, where
the probability value of the initial stage output is utilized
as an additional feature to complement the original features.
This enables the final decision stage to efficiently classify
various types of attacks.
Extensive experiments have been conducted on two
public datasets; specifically the benchmark KDD99 and
UNSW-NB15 datasets. The latter comprises more compli-
cated types of attacks to evaluate our proposed deep learn-
ing models. In the experiments, we performed two steps,
namely data preprocessing and normalization, on the features
of the datasets to make them more amenable to detection.
In terms of multi-class detection accuracy, TSDL achieved
impressive results, up to 99.996% for the KDD99 dataset
and 89.134% for the UNSW-NB15 dataset, with a low FAR.
Additionally, in terms of efficiency, the execution time con-
sumed by the proposed model is very low, which makes
it appropriate for future deployment in real-time intrusion
detection tasks. Comparison with state-of-the-art approaches
has demonstrated the robustness of the TSDL model, which
can hence serve as a future benchmark for the deep learning
and network security research communities. For future work,
we plan to integrate our deep learning approach with novel
reinforcement [12] and multi-task [14] learning algorithms,
to further optimize our proposed network intrusion detection
system.
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